PDF & document processing
Parse, split, and extract text from contracts, invoices, and filings with standard Python tooling.
4 to 32 vCPU for PDF, OCR, RAG indexing, Whisper, and ETL. You generate the attestation inside the VM, on your own challenge, and check it on your own machine up to the AMD root, with the chain fetched from AMD. The measurement is not compared with a reference image. The guest kernel uses VMPCK0, consistent with VMPL 0 (no SVSM); the report’s VMPL field is the level you request.
Per-second billing · one hour prepaid at launch.
Workloads that don’t need a GPU.
Parse, split, and extract text from contracts, invoices, and filings with standard Python tooling.
Run Tesseract, PaddleOCR, or EasyOCR on scanned documents without paying for a GPU.
Generate CPU-friendly embeddings (BGE, GTE, MiniLM) and index into Qdrant, Weaviate, Milvus, or LanceDB.
Transcribe depositions, consultations, or call recordings with whisper.cpp on optimized CPU paths.
Move data between CRM, ERP, S3, and SFTP on a machine sized for the job.
Run agents, schedulers, and webhook receivers that do not need a GPU.
AMD EPYC with AMD SEV-SNP, Ubuntu 24.04 image, per-second billing, one hour prepaid at launch.
From a test on a Small tier on 27 October 2026. Run the script yourself: the check that counts is yours.
Inside the VM, the kernel reports AMD SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP memory encryption active, and the SEV guest device /dev/sev-guest is present. These tiers have no GPU.
Our script asks the AMD secure processor for a signed report bound to a 64-byte challenge you choose; on your own machine, with the chain and the VCEK fetched from AMD (ARK pinned), snpguest 0.11.0 checks ARK, ASK, VCEK and the report, up to the AMD root.
The launch measurement in the report is not compared with any published reference image. It shows a genuine SEV-SNP guest on an AMD chip, not which exact image runs.
The report’s VMPL field is the level you request (our script asks for 0). The guest kernel uses VMPCK0, consistent with VMPL 0 (no SVSM). No disk encryption claim is made for this tier.
From your machine, against the VM. The challenge is yours, so an old report cannot be replayed. The AMD chain is fetched from AMD on your machine: the certificates in the archive come from the VM and are never used.
curl -sSO https://voltagegpu.com/blog/two-proofs/evidence/snp-proof-in-the-vm.sh
CHALLENGE=$(python3 -c 'import secrets;print(secrets.token_hex(64))')
ssh -p <port> ubuntu@<ip> "CHALLENGE=$CHALLENGE bash -s" < snp-proof-in-the-vm.sh
scp -P <port> ubuntu@<ip>:/tmp/snp-proof.tgz .
# on your own machine: the archive goes to a new directory, and the AMD chain is fetched from AMD again, never the certs from the archive
D=$(mktemp -d) && tar xzf snp-proof.tgz -C "$D" && (cd "$D" && sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS)
CHALLENGE=$CHALLENGE bash snp-proof-in-the-vm.sh --check-report-data "$D/report.bin"
bash snp-proof-in-the-vm.sh --check-report-policy "$D/report.bin"
A=$(mktemp -d) && (cd "$D" && snpguest fetch ca pem "$A" -r report.bin && snpguest fetch vcek pem "$A" report.bin)
bash snp-proof-in-the-vm.sh --check-ark "$A/ark.pem"
(cd "$D" && snpguest verify certs "$A" && snpguest verify attestation "$A" report.bin)
# --check-report-policy expects VMPL 0, the level the script requests by default; if the run in the VM said it asked again at VMPL 1, add 1 as the last argumentGPU Confidential VMs add an NVIDIA GPU, with GPU attestation on the tested models.