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EU AI Act High-Risk LLMs: What Applies From December 2027

Annex III high-risk obligations of the EU AI Act apply from 2 December 2027 (Regulation 2026/1744). The compliance map, and what a TDX quote proves.

Companion long-form on X, read the X Article version

Working in EU financial services? Pair this with our DORA Article 28 register guide for AI vendors , same evidence pipeline, different supervisor.

Key Takeaways

  • December 2, 2027 is the deadline (deferred from August 2, 2026 by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744) for high-risk AI obligations under Annex III. Hiring, credit, healthcare triage, critical infrastructure, justice, migration. If your LLM touches any of these, the clock has nearly run out.
  • Article 15 is the technical wall. "Accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity" is what notified bodies actually push on. Software-only controls rarely survive that conversation.
  • TDX attestation is the cleanest Article 15 evidence currently shippable. A cryptographically-signed Intel quote settles the tampering-resistance prong in one artifact.
  • Penalties scale to 3% of global turnover for high-risk non-compliance. For most mid-market firms that is a board-level number, not an IT line item.

Most teams are in one of two states. Either they have not started on the EU AI Act because "the deadline feels far," or they have started and they are stuck on Article 15. Both states share a root cause: the Act is being read as a documentation exercise. It is not. It is a technical conformity regime, and the technical bar is higher than most in-house counsels were briefed to expect.

I wrote this so a CTO, a Head of Compliance, or a regulated-sector founder can read it once and walk away with three things: a clear picture of who is in scope, a working definition of Article 15 evidence, and a path that does not require burning Q3 on rework. Some of what follows is uncomfortable. The Act is genuinely hard, the deadlines are real, and the fines are not theatre. Better to know now.

Who Is Actually In Scope

The Act regulates the use-case, not the model. A general-purpose Llama-3.1 deployment is not automatically high-risk. The same Llama-3.1 deployed to screen CVs for a hiring pipeline is. Annex III enumerates the eight high-risk categories. As of February 2026 Commission guidance, the practical map looks like this:

  • Employment: hiring, performance evaluation, task allocation, promotion, termination decisions assisted by AI.
  • Education and vocational training: admissions, grading, exam-cheating detection, behavioural monitoring of students.
  • Access to essential services: credit scoring, insurance pricing, social benefits, emergency services dispatch.
  • Critical infrastructure: safety components in road traffic, water, gas, electricity, healthcare devices.
  • Law enforcement: predictive policing, evidence reliability assessment, profiling.
  • Migration, asylum, border control: risk assessment, document verification, lie-detection equivalents.
  • Administration of justice and democratic processes: anything assisting judicial decision-making or election integrity.
  • Biometric identification: real-time and post-event, plus emotion recognition in workplaces and schools.

If you are running an LLM behind any of the above, you are a provider or deployer of a high-risk system, the two roles have different duties, but both are bound by the December 2027 timeline. The fastest self-check most legal teams use:

Annex III high-risk self-check
# Quick Annex III high-risk self-check (compressed).
# If ANY answer is yes, your LLM use-case is in scope of the December 2027 deadline.

scenarios = [
    "Does your LLM influence access to education, employment, or promotions?",
    "Does it score creditworthiness, insurance pricing, or social benefits?",
    "Does it triage emergency calls, healthcare, or critical infrastructure?",
    "Does it support law enforcement, migration, asylum, or border control?",
    "Does it inform judicial decisions or democratic processes?",
    "Does it perform biometric identification or emotion recognition at work/school?",
]

if any_yes(scenarios):
    print("HIGH-RISK under Annex III. Article 9-15 obligations apply by 2027-12-02.")
    print("You need: risk management, data governance, technical docs,")
    print("logging, transparency, human oversight, and Article 15 cybersecurity.")

The Articles That Actually Bite

On paper, providers of high-risk AI systems must satisfy Articles 9 through 15. In practice, three of them are where audits live or die:

  1. Article 10, Data and Data Governance. Training, validation, and test datasets must be relevant, representative, free of obvious errors, and complete. For LLM fine-tunes this means a documented data lineage. Most teams have this in some form already from GDPR Article 30 records.
  2. Article 14, Human Oversight. The system must be designed so a human can intervene meaningfully. This is operational, not just documentary, your UI has to let a reviewer override or revoke a decision before it has effect.
  3. Article 15, Accuracy, Robustness, and Cybersecurity. The third prong, cybersecurity, is where confidential computing has become the de-facto answer. The Act demands resistance to third-party attempts to alter use, behaviour, or performance. A privileged hypervisor reading model weights or rewriting a system prompt at runtime is exactly the threat model the Article was drafted against.

The Act also weaves through GDPR Article 32 territory when personal data is involved. Both regimes converge on the same conclusion: vendor promises are not evidence; cryptographic attestation is.

What Article 15 Evidence Actually Looks Like

Article 15(5) requires "technical solutions to address AI-specific vulnerabilities, including measures to prevent, detect, respond to, resolve and control for attacks trying to manipulate the training dataset (data poisoning), pre-trained components used in training (model poisoning), inputs designed to cause the AI model to make a mistake (adversarial examples or model evasion), confidentiality attacks or model flaws."

The notified body lens. When a designated body audits your high-risk system, they ask one core question: "show me you can prove this thing is doing what you say it is doing." A cryptographically signed Intel TDX attestation quote answers that with one artifact: the enclave is real, the firmware is unmodified, the workload measurement matches what you pinned, and no software layer above the workload, hypervisor or host OS included, can read or rewrite its memory. The one limit worth stating to the auditor yourself: Intel places physical interposer attacks outside what memory encryption protects, demonstrated by the DDRop research of 14 September 2026, so the quote answers for the software boundary and not for someone who can open the machine.

Operationally, the evidence you can produce today comes from a few commands, run inside your Confidential VM and then on your own machine:

Generate and verify both proofs, shell
# Inside your Confidential VM: generate both proofs on a challenge you choose
# The image ships without pip: install it first
curl -sS https://bootstrap.pypa.io/get-pip.py | python3 - --user --break-system-packages
python3 -m pip install --user --break-system-packages "voltage-verify[attest]>=0.2.1"
export PATH=$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH
voltage-verify manifest --challenge auto -o manifest.json
sudo env PATH=$PATH PYTHONPATH=$(python3 -c 'import site;print(site.getusersitepackages())') \
  voltage-verify attest --manifest manifest.json --mode single-gpu -o bundle.json

# On your own machine: check the Intel TDX quote and the NVIDIA report
pip install "voltage-verify>=0.2.1"
voltage-verify verify bundle.json --challenge <the challenge printed above>
# RESULT: VERIFIED

What those commands give you: an Intel TDX quote and an NVIDIA GPU report that the CNIL or BfDI auditor can verify on their own machine without trusting us, both bound to a challenge you chose. What they do not give you: a binding to a specific model and prompt template; record those in your technical documentation.

Penalty Math, Without the Theatre

Prohibited practices
Article 5, manipulative AI, social scoring
Cap
€35M / 7% turnover
Effective since
2025-02-02
Tier 1
High-risk non-compliance
Articles 9–15, the bulk of LLM use-cases
Cap
€15M / 3% turnover
Effective from
2027-12-02
Tier 2
Incorrect information to authority
Article 99, misleading the regulator
Cap
€7.5M / 1% turnover
Effective since
2025-08-02
Tier 3

Two practical notes. SMEs and startups receive the lower of the two caps, not the higher, a deliberate Commission concession to avoid extinction-level fines for smaller actors. And the percentage is calculated on the group worldwide turnover for the preceding financial year, not the relevant subsidiary's. For mid-market financial services, that is the difference between a manageable line item and a board-level event.

A Practical Roadmap For The Next 90 Days

  1. Map your in-scope systems. Use the Annex III checker. For each yes, declare provider vs deployer status. This is a one-week exercise for a typical mid-market firm.
  2. Stand up technical documentation per Annex IV. Most of it is recyclable from your existing model cards plus GDPR Article 30 records. Budget two to three weeks.
  3. Move inference for in-scope systems behind an attested enclave. This is where most teams underestimate effort. With VoltageGPU Confidential VMs you run the workload inside a trust domain you control and generate the TDX quote and the NVIDIA GPU attestation yourself; the inference API does not return an attestation with each request. Requests pass through our relay, which sees them in clear (TLS ends at our host). To keep plaintext off our servers, run your own inference server in a Confidential VM and terminate TLS inside its trust domain. With Azure Confidential Computing it is heavier and the unit price is higher (NCC H100 v5 lists from $6.98/hr in East US 2 to $8.90/hr in West Europe, Azure Retail Prices API, 7 November 2026).
  4. Wire human-oversight controls into the UI. Reviewer override, audit trail, hard stop on confidence-below-threshold cases. Article 14 is the easiest article to fail on default ChatGPT-style deployments.
  5. Engage a notified body early. Get on the calendar now even if your evidence pack is not ready, the relationship discount on rework is real.

What This Article Does Not Solve (Pratfall, Honest Edition)

I would rather you know the limitations now than discover them mid-audit:

  • Confidential computing does not replace human oversight. Article 14 is operational. If your application does not let a human meaningfully intervene, no attestation quote will save you.
  • It does not produce model-card or data-governance evidence. Article 10 still wants a documented data lineage. TDX protects execution, not provenance.
  • Notified body availability is the real bottleneck. Plan accordingly.
  • The Act is still being interpreted. The Commission, EDPS, and national authorities are issuing guidance on a rolling basis through 2026. Build for the spirit of Article 15 (verifiable tamper-resistance) rather than chasing every paragraph.

Who Should Read This Twice

  • Heads of Compliance and DPOs at EU regulated firms operating in financial services, healthcare, HR-tech, legal-tech, edtech, and gov-tech.
  • CTOs and platform leads who built an internal LLM gateway in 2024-2025 and now need to bring it to AI Act conformity.
  • Founders of B2B AI products selling into Annex III use-cases, your buyers will increasingly require AI Act evidence as part of vendor onboarding from mid-2026.

Two starting points if you want to go deeper: our confidential computing primer for the architecture, and the GDPR & AI 2026 piece for the privacy-side of the same conversation.

Corrected on 27 October 2026. The high-risk dates in the body and in the code now follow Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI, in force since 27 July 2026): Annex III obligations apply from 2 December 2027. Penalties for incorrect information have applied since 2 August 2025. Earlier versions also showed an endpoint and quote fields that our API does not have (the code now shows the commands of a real run), described a workflow "we ship" to compliance teams, ended on a "first hour offered" that did not match our welcome credit, and said notified bodies were booked for Q3 and Q4 2026 without a source.

FAQ

When exactly does the EU AI Act apply to high-risk systems?
The Act entered into force on August 1, 2024. Chapter II prohibitions kicked in on February 2, 2025. General-Purpose AI obligations applied from August 2, 2025, and Article 50 transparency duties from August 2, 2026. The high-risk obligations under Annex III (employment, credit, healthcare triage, critical infrastructure, justice, migration) were deferred by the Digital Omnibus on AI (Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, in force July 27, 2026) to December 2, 2027; high-risk AI embedded in Annex I regulated products moves to August 2, 2028. In short: transparency and GPAI duties are live now, the full high-risk regime lands December 2027.
Is my LLM automatically high-risk?
No. Most LLMs are GPAI models (Article 51) or limited-risk systems (Article 50 transparency). They become high-risk only when used inside an Annex III use-case, for example, a generic Llama deployment is not high-risk, but a Llama-based hiring screen or credit scoring assistant is. The Act regulates the use-case, not the model. The Commission published Annex III guidance in February 2026 that clarified this.
What does Article 15 ("accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity") actually require?
Three things, in plain terms: (1) the system must perform consistently throughout its lifecycle; (2) it must resist errors, faults, and inconsistencies through redundancy and fail-safes; (3) it must resist unauthorized third-party attempts to alter its use, behaviour, or performance. The third leg is where confidential computing earns its keep, TDX-attested execution is currently the only widely-shipped technology that gives a notified body cryptographic proof your inference pipeline was not tampered with by privileged software on the host. It does not cover a party who can open the machine: Intel puts physical interposer attacks outside what memory encryption protects, and the DDRop research of 14 September 2026 showed such a party can even overwrite the launch measurement. Say that to the auditor yourself rather than be asked.
How do penalties work?
Three tiers, capped at the higher of a fixed amount or a percentage of global annual turnover: (1) prohibited practices, up to €35M or 7%; (2) high-risk non-compliance, up to €15M or 3%; (3) supplying incorrect information to authorities, up to €7.5M or 1%. SMEs and startups get the lower of the two caps. National competent authorities (in France: the CNIL plus the DGCCRF, supervised by a forthcoming central AI authority) issue the fines.
Does GDPR Article 32 evidence count for AI Act Article 15?
They overlap but do not perfectly substitute. GDPR Article 32 is about protecting personal data; AI Act Article 15 is about protecting the system itself, including against tampering of model behaviour. A TDX attestation quote can serve both, as evidence of the trust domain your workload ran in. That is why one evidence workflow can feed DPIAs, AI Act technical documentation and ISO 42001 audits at the same time. See our companion piece on GDPR DPAs for the privacy-only angle.

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